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ABSTRACT
Sailing in the Shadow of the Vietnam War: 
The GDR Government and the  
“Vietnam Bonus” of the Early 1970s
Gerd Horten
In concert with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, the East German 
government vigorously opposed the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s 
and supported North Vietnam politically and economically. Concurrently, it spon-
sored ongoing solidarity campaigns in support of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam (DRV) against the US-led coalition. As the American war effort deteriorated, 
the East German government reaped a significant boost both internationally and 
domestically as a result of these campaigns. This “Vietnam Bonus” helped to 
enhance the international stature of the GDR and increased the domestic stability 
of the SED government in the early 1970s.
The Vietnam War provided the East German government with a golden opportunity. 
No functionary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands, SED) could have dreamed up a better script for the country’s Cold War 
propaganda. It had all of the ingredients and characters for a gripping and winning 
formula: an aggressive capitalist American intruder who became all the more menac-
ing as the war went on; the evil West German ally who assisted the imperialist bully 
and became implicated in its destructive actions; a socialist Vietnamese underdog 
whom much of the world and the East German population eventually supported; and 
a benevolent Soviet neighbor who supplied and aided the Vietnamese victim at the 
same time as it was seeking to bring all sides to the negotiating table. Even the ongo-
ing conflict between the two great Communist powers, China and the Soviet Union, 
which intensified during the second half of the 1960s, could not spoil this powerful 
narrative. While the GDR followed the lead of the Soviet Union and worked in close 
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collaboration with its East Bloc allies, the propaganda value of the Vietnam War was 
all too good to be true, and certainly too good to pass up.1 
Best of all, unlike the building of the Berlin Wall, which was allegedly constructed 
in 1961 to protect the East German population, or the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968, which was justified as brotherly assistance for a neighbor facing an 
alleged threat of a “counterrevolution,” this Vietnam War narrative did not have to 
be invented nor stubbornly defended against the better knowledge of an ever skepti-
cal East German population. On this issue, the SED leadership would ultimately 
be vindicated for its early condemnation of the war and joined by an ever-widening 
number of Western media and publics as well. Not surprisingly then, its anti-Vietnam 
stance and numerous Vietnam solidarity campaigns were one of the centerpieces 
of its critique of the capitalist system and often functioned as a key linchpin in its 
propaganda war against the imperialist West in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And 
the longer the war lasted, the more convincing this narrative became.2 
Even American officials had to concede that they had handed the East German 
government an important strategic advantage. As a secret public opinion survey by 
the United States Information Agency (USIA) highlighted, the Vietnam War proved 
to be a trump card for the GDR propaganda war with East German audiences: “The 
East German regime’s propaganda drumfire and its ‘solidarity’ meetings on VN [Viet 
Nam] doubtless [sic] have had some impact, fostering the belief that the US is a 
colonialist and imperialist power bent on squashing a legitimate national liberation 
movement in SE Asia.” Equally importantly, it gave the SED regime a significant boost 
in its standing with its own population, as the American survey emphasized: “While 
East Germans are constitutionally skeptical of regime propaganda on all issues, the 
official line may have more credibility on VN than all other issues. One of the main 
counteracting sources of information for East Germans, Western TV, has not been 
notably effective in presenting the US case.”3 And this assessment was reported in 
1966, well before the American war effort deteriorated and in advance of increasing 
reports of US war crimes in Vietnam, which would create strong worldwide opposition 
and provide ever more fuel for the East German propaganda mill.
It is somewhat surprising how little the Vietnam War, specifically the consistent 
and forceful opposition of the East German government to the war, has been incorpo-
rated into the overall historical scholarship of the GDR in the late 1960s and 1970s.4 
Neither studies on the foreign relations of East Germany nor analyses of the domestic 
politics of the SED government have paid this issue much attention.5 Likewise, even 
scholars trying to understand and explain the relative longevity and stability of the 
GDR have overlooked the Vietnam narrative as a contributing factor.6
In order to fully appreciate the political advantage which the Vietnam War pro-
vided for the GDR government, it is important to recognize the generally skeptical 
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and distrustful attitude which the East German population had towards its political 
leadership. As many historians have attested, the hold of the East German government 
on its population was always a tenuous one and nowhere near as total as the term 
“dictatorship” would imply—despite its elaborate surveillance and spying activities. 
The SED leadership was generally resigned to the fact that most people withdrew 
into their own personal spaces and condoned, for example, the routine consump-
tion of Western media by the early 1970s as long as it did not challenge the political 
order. Noncooperation, reluctant support for government initiatives and consistent 
“grumbling” were part and parcel of daily life in the GDR and highlight this complex 
social contract between the SED leadership and the people of East Germany.7
This article analyzes three layers of the East German antiwar and Vietnam solidar-
ity campaigns. The most immediate criticism was aimed at the United States and 
by extension West Germany, which according to GDR officials revealed their global 
imperialist aspirations through their attack against a socialist country. Within these 
campaigns, the harshest political attacks were often reserved for the West German 
class enemy, who in the eyes of the East German government had created a special 
alliance with the United States in order to carry out its capitalist revanchist strategy. 
The second political layer of the GDR’s vigorous antiwar campaigns connected the 
East German government with numerous international organizations and antiwar 
movements. Primary among these efforts was the active participation and at times 
leadership of the GDR in the yearly Stockholm antiwar conferences. The final key 
target of the official antiwar propaganda was the East German population. Though 
eternally skeptical of all official initiatives, large segments of the public supported 
many of the Vietnam solidarity campaigns primarily in the second half of the war. 
This was in no small measure due to the fact that the antiwar sentiment in the GDR 
grew in the late 1960s just as it did in the rest of the world. Based on the documen-
tary evidence, public support for Vietnam solidarity campaigns in the GDR peaked 
between 1972 and 1975.
Finally, this article also addresses some of the complications and hurdles in the 
path of this successful antiwar strategy, most notably the suppression of the Prague 
Spring and the GDR’s support for and participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in early 1968. Yet despite this and other obstacles, the GDR’s anti-Vietnam activities 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s consolidated the SED government’s international 
status. Just as important, this “Vietnam Bonus” provided a significant boost to the 
internal stability of the GDR in the early to mid-1970s, because East Germany’s early 
opposition to the war was ultimately validated and because the Vietnam solidarity 
campaigns were supported by increasing portions of the generally disaffected East 
German population in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Layer 1: Exposing the True Intentions of  
the American and West German Enemies
One of the great advantages of the Vietnam War for East Berlin, as the US analysis 
emphasized, was that the escalating conflict merged so easily with some of the main 
propaganda themes of East Germany’s Cold War rhetoric. One of the central ones 
was that the United States was an imperialist power bent on economic exploitation 
as well as world conquest and committed to subduing liberation movements in the 
developing world.8
Not surprisingly, the GDR blasted the United States for its aggressive actions in 
Vietnam with the onset of the war, as reflected in the coverage of Neues Deutschland, 
East Germany’s main party newspaper. As early as August 1964, the newspaper 
accused the United States of a “war of aggression” in connection with the Gulf of 
Tonkin crisis and argued that President Johnson and the American Congress were 
purposefully provoking a war in Vietnam. When the American Congress passed the 
Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the GDR vigorously condemned the early bombing cam-
paigns against North Vietnam, highlighted the worldwide protests against the US 
actions, and solidly placed itself on the side of the North Vietnamese people in the 
conflict.9 As might be expected, these harsh attacks against the US-led war increased 
after 1965 as the American ground war intensified and the bombing raids escalated, 
coinciding with heightened international criticism of the conflict and intensifying 
solidarity campaigns and demonstrations in East Germany. 
Even though the détente policies were gathering speed in the late 1960s, the 
Vietnam War provided an easy target for steady propaganda against “barbaric Ameri-
cans” and ongoing criticism against ruthless US attacks. The GDR interpreted the US 
military campaigns in Vietnam and the eventual invasions in Cambodia and Laos as 
part of a worldwide campaign of aggression and as a blatant attempt to halt commu-
nism’s historic march towards victory. Articles like those entitled “Adventurous Plans 
of the Pentagon” or “Poison War Against Women and Children in South Vietnam” 
ran continuously in the East German media through the late 1960s and beyond. 
Likewise, East Germany eagerly followed the growing financial and economic difficul-
ties which the United States encountered in its pursuit of the war and increasingly 
merged coverage of America’s international aggression with reports on its domestic 
conflicts and racial turmoil. Finally, it was of incalculable value to the GDR govern-
ment that few of these stories had to be invented and that more and more Western, 
and especially West German, media were seconding the East German point of view 
by the late 1960s and especially in the early 1970s.10
The unrivaled strength of the Vietnam War narrative from an East German 
perspective was that the SED leadership could simultaneously attack its two main 
Cold War enemies: it easily lent itself for attacks against the imperialist motives of 
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the United States, yet it was equally easy to implicate West Germany in this narrative. 
By March 1966, Neues Deutschland escalated its rhetoric against the United States 
and referred to Vietnam as a war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg). And as East 
German journalists saw it, West Germany was providing both political and military 
support for the US campaigns. As one article put it, “Even the bourgeois press has 
to concede: Bonn is providing bombs for the dirty war in Vietnam! This naked fact 
exposes that all the talk about ‘humanitarian aid’ is cynical double-talk.” The GDR 
media increasingly focused on the escalation of the war, the use of poison gas, and 
the increasing protests in both East and West in 1966. Meanwhile East Germany 
portrayed itself as the true “German peace state,” offering support and assistance to 
the innocent workers and farmers of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).11
Another continuous thread in the verbal assault against the West German neighbor 
was the persistent innuendos hinting at the participation of German troops in Vietnam. 
As early as June of 1965, East Germany was reporting that the West German army 
(Bundeswehr) was preparing military missions. In addition to the financial and military 
aid that West Germany was already providing, Neues Deutschland argued that the 
Bonn government was just waiting for the “appropriate moment” when West German 
soldiers would become engaged in the war. By March of 1966, the paper was referring 
to detailed studies by West Germany’s armed forces which allegedly advocated for the 
use of its troops in the Vietnam theater. The cited study recommended active West 
German military participation in order to consolidate the alliance with the United 
States.12 The fact that no such West German troops ever materialized and that the 
Bonn government consistently rejected American requests for German boots on the 
ground did not dissuade the ongoing use of these allegations.
The fact of the matter was that the East German government was well informed 
about the extent of the West German support for South Vietnam as well as its relations 
with the United States. In a detailed internal report from April 1966, for example, SED 
officials highlighted especially the economic and humanitarian aid which the Bonn 
government was providing the South Vietnamese government. The report conceded 
that the direct benefits of the war for West Germany were rather minor. It highlighted 
that the German economy had only marginally benefitted from the additional orders 
which the increased US expenditures had created. There was no “Vietnam-Boom,” 
nothing equivalent to the “Korea-Boom” which the West German economy allegedly 
experienced in connection with the war in the early 1950s. Much of the support for 
South Vietnam, moreover, had come in the form of food deliveries, medical supplies, 
or by providing civilian internships to South Vietnamese students and trainees. In an 
almost disappointed tone, the GDR officials had to admit in their report that “there 
were no West German investments worth mentioning in South Vietnam.” Overall the 
analysis concluded that while the German economic interests in the war were rather 
562 German Studies Review 36 /3 • 2013
negligible, “the West German government viewed its support to South Vietnam as 
moral assistance for the United States with the hope of shifting the balance of the 
international system in favor of the imperialist forces.”13
Vietnam was seen as the latest example in a number of military campaigns which 
defined this capitalist strategy. But, as one GDR historian argued, it took on a special 
role because it was the most flagrant example of this neoimperialist campaign and 
represented the “most horrific colonial warfare in human history.” Simultaneously, 
it was seen as only one piece in America’s Cold War “strategy of roll-back,” through 
which it was trying to thwart the blossoming of recently liberated, socialist states in 
regions ripe for freedom and self-determination. Southeast Asia, together with Latin 
America and Africa, was viewed as the latest and third front in this concerted global 
US-led strategy.14 
What is of course noticeable here is how closely these arguments overlapped with 
the emerging critiques of the Vietnam War in Western Europe and in the United 
States. As the war dragged on, growing segments of populations in Western countries 
no longer viewed America through the lens of World War II liberator and protector of 
democracy and freedom. The war slowly but surely eroded this attractive image and 
put even the staunchest defenders of the United States on the defensive. After the 
repeated and brutal bombing raids, after My Lai and the invasion of Cambodia, after 
the use of napalm and other poison gases, who would want to defend this raging giant 
seemingly bent on mindless destruction? By 1969, this shift in Western and world 
opinion was widespread and endemic, and well known in Washington. A secret 1969 
USIA public opinion survey captured this emerging global consensus: “The results 
of the survey research provide a rather bleak picture,” the survey conceded. In all 
regions of the globe, with the sole exception of some countries in Southeast Asia 
such as Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, majorities in most countries of the 
world wanted the United States to end the war in Vietnam and pull out its troops.15
However, the East German government reserved its most biting comments and 
criticism for its West German adversary. It emphasized the fact that the Bonn gov-
ernment, even its widely respected Chancellor Willy Brandt, was a most compliant 
ally supportive of America’s Vietnam War. Interpreting this acquiescence as steady 
support for the United States policies, East Berlin ascribed West Germany a particu-
larly significant role in the overall neoimperialist capitalist global strategy and liked 
to refer to the “special alliance” (Sonderbündnis) between Washington and Bonn. 
As a government-sponsored analysis put it, the “special alliance of the West German 
and American imperialism . . . [represented] not only the longest and strongest, but 
also the most aggressive union of economic and political interests.” Therefore, it was 
no coincidence that the FRG quietly overlooked even the most egregious violations 
of basic human rights and international laws in Vietnam and effectively had become 
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the coconspirator of the United States in what the study referred to as “a ruthless 
genocide.”16
West German politicians were quite aware that they were vulnerable to what 
became known as the “guilt-by-association” argument (Mitschuld), but they felt that 
they had little leeway to blunt these cutting attacks. They believed that the country 
owed a great debt to the United States for its past assistance and knew that it continued 
to rely on American protection more urgently than any other West European country. 
In addition, the Brandt government was very aware that it needed US backing if it 
wanted Ostpolitik to succeed. In short, because of its unique military and geostrategic 
location as well as its own foreign relations initiatives, West Germany was trapped, 
forced to stand side by side with an ever more unpopular America in a conflict the 
world and its own population increasingly despised.17
Not surprisingly, this notion of West Germany as an accomplice and most trusted 
ally in Vietnam remained a core element in East Germany’s Cold War battle and 
seamlessly continued a key theme advanced by the SED government since the late 
1940s. By the late 1960s, articles insinuating the shipment of West German poison 
gas to Vietnam and Bonn’s willingness “to pay for the US war without reservation” 
cemented and elaborated on the “guilt-by-association” argument—a charge which 
became increasingly difficult to refute.18 In fact, by the early 1970s East Berlin took 
this argument one step further arguing that West Germany was indeed enabling 
the United States to keep fighting its war by providing the monetary resources to do 
so. East German officials argued that this financial and monetary cover by the FRG 
allowed the war to continue and was equivalent to financing all American military 
operations in Vietnam during the year 1970.19
The question of “Who paid for Vietnam?” indeed became an explosive issue both 
in East and West Germany in the final years of the war. The increasing cost of the war 
significantly contributed to the United States’ worsening financial position, especially 
its balance-of-payments deficit. Western European countries—West Germany in 
particular—were securing the value of the US dollar through buying large amounts 
of American reserves and refused to sell them even as the value of the dollar began 
to decline, thus indirectly helping to finance the war. This was done with an implicit 
understanding of the “Atlantic bargain,” by which the United States provided military 
protection in exchange for international monetary support from its allies. As Hubert 
Zimmermann highlights, in this way America’s allies helped finance the Vietnam 
War through what he refers to as “an indirect ‘Vietnam tax.’” This indirect support 
became especially apparent after consecutive devaluations of the dollar in the early 
1970s, when the currency lost about forty percent of its value. Any country holding 
US dollar reserves, with West Germany leading the pack, lost an equivalent share of 
their dollar reserves. In a 1971 interview, the president of the German Central Bank 
564 German Studies Review 36 /3 • 2013
remarked with regret: “We should have been more firm with the Americans.” That 
same year, the left-leaning West German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau put 
the matter more bluntly and more in line with that of the East German government: 
“Our economists and our banks know it, even though our politicians don’t want to 
acknowledge it, but our country feels that we have paid a large portion of the sense-
less, murderous war in Vietnam and continue to do so.”20
East Berlin’s politicians and media frequently returned to these accusations. By the 
summer of 1967, in articles such as “In Hitler’s Tracks,” Neues Deutschland compared 
the “pacification attempts by South Vietnam and the United States to the early phase 
of Hitler’s conquest.” A couple of weeks later it published a similar attack under the 
heading, “The Nazi Cross on the US Dollar.” This latter article argued that the foreign 
relations of the United States in Vietnam were littered with atrocious war crimes and 
found their domestic equivalent in the ruthless exploitation and suppression of the 
black minorities within its own borders. In all of this, the continued and steady West 
German monetary support was of critical importance and deeply implicated the Bonn 
government, as the writer emphasized.21
This fear of the resurgence of fascism as well as of once again failing the test of 
history ran like a red thread through all of the West German protest movements and 
Figure 1. GDR Vietnam Solidarity Exhibit, 1969 (Courtesy of BStU Archiv; 
MfS-ZAIG-Fo-1361-Bild-0026)
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the antiwar campaigns as well. As early as 1966 the West German antiwar movement 
began to refer to the “American genocide in Vietnam” and drew direct connections 
between the US atrocities committed in Vietnam and those carried out by the Nazis 
during World War II. A poster distributed by the West German antiwar movement 
in 1966 asked the poignant question: “How much longer will we allow murder to be 
committed in our names?” As the American bombing campaigns kept rolling over 
North Vietnam again and again, the events reminded Germans of their own ruined 
cities and inevitably aroused sympathy for the innocent North Vietnamese victims 
caught up in the inevitable slaughter.22 Moreover, the compelling rationale of the 
antiwar protests was not to once again condone atrocities and war crimes but instead 
to answer the call implied in the popular German protest slogan “He who keeps quiet 
agrees.”23
In West Germany, the Tet Offensive and the revelations of the atrocities at My Lai 
and other locations reported in 1969 caused a significant revision in media coverage, 
but they were also deeply embedded in the domestic struggles of the FRG. Not only did 
the ideological differences of the West German print media become more pronounced, 
but more journalists were moving towards critical or even outright oppositional report-
ing starting in 1969. A final trope of reporting, which gained more currency in the 
latter stage of the war, was the indirect and inadvertent blurring of Nazi war crimes 
and American atrocities in Vietnam. The reports of the use of chemical warfare by 
the United States, the barbaric bombing campaigns, and the mass killings of innocent 
civilians by American GIs merged with the domestic discourse of German World War II 
war crimes.24 In East and West Germany, the war in Vietnam was increasingly viewed 
as unjustifiable, immoral and reprehensible by the late 1960s and early 1970s, giving 
ever more sustenance to the concerted GDR antiwar campaigns.
Layer 2: Reaping the Political Rewards  
of International Antiwar Collaboration
The manifold activities of the GDR Vietnam Committee were accompanied by a 
flurry of international antiwar politics on the part of East Germany’s broader Solidar-
ity Committee, which led to significant conferences both inside and outside of the 
country. Most of the conferences hosted by the GDR itself focused on interpreting 
the Vietnam War through a communist lens, which viewed it as part of a concerted 
global imperialist campaign led by the United States meant to undermine the rise of 
independent and socialist countries. The vast majority of these events were attended 
by socialist or Warsaw Pact countries only. One such conference held in East Berlin 
in February of 1969, for example, focused on the problems of the anti-imperialist 
struggle in Asian countries. Of the roughly two hundred participants, forty-seven came 
from abroad, but only five of them were from West European countries.25
Much more vital in terms of international cooperation and recognition was the 
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increasing participation of the GDR in antiwar conferences held in West European 
countries. Most significant among these were the annual Vietnam Conferences in 
Stockholm, which first convened in 1966 and eventually gained broad-based interna-
tional recognition and were later attended by national governmental representatives 
as well. The GDR sent its first delegation in 1967 and gradually gained the respect 
of the fellow attendees. In 1970, the GDR Vietnam Committee was invited to join 
the Executive Committee of the Stockholm Vietnam Conference in recognition of its 
numerous contributions to the international antiwar campaigns. Aside from monetary 
and other donations, its scientific studies which proved the use of biological and 
chemical warfare in Vietnam were seen as very influential contributions.26
Equally important was another venture which significantly added to the prestige 
of the GDR in the international anti–Vietnam War movement: the powerful docu-
mentaries made by Studio H&S, named after the two documentary makers Walter 
Heynowski and Gerhard Scheumann. During the heyday of its influence between the 
mid-1960s and the late 1970s, this legendary team focused most of its films on biting 
critiques against Western imperialism, especially the war in Vietnam, as well as attacks 
against West Germany. While the documentaries were primarily made for domestic 
consumption, many were purchased by news and TV organizations outside the East 
Bloc and viewed in different parts of Western Europe and the developing world.27
The two most renowned early anti-imperialist and antiwar documentaries were 
Der lachende Mann: Bekenntnisse eines Mörders (The Laughing Man: Confessions 
of a Murderer) which aired in 1966 and Piloten im Pyjama (Pilots in Pajamas) 
released in 1968. The first focused on a German Foreign Legionnaire, an ex-soldier 
of the Wehrmacht from World War II, who had continued his murderous trade in 
the name of anticommunism under the guise of Western imperialism in different 
parts of the developing world. Pilots in Pajamas, by contrast, focused directly on the 
United States and the Vietnam War. It consisted of interviews with ten American pilots 
who had been shot down in attacks over North Vietnam. It was not their murderous 
intent but rather their ordinary nature which was the focal point of the four-part 
series. Important in a German context, like the defendants in the post–World War II 
Nuremberg Trials, their default answer to the question of their motivation was that 
they had simply followed orders when attacking targets in the DRV.28
East Germany also became especially involved in consecutive conferences which 
focused on US war crimes in Indochina. After the initial one in Stockholm in 1970, 
the next two were hosted by two NATO countries—Norway and Denmark—a point 
which was not lost on SED officials. At the conference held in Oslo in June of 1971, 
the GDR delegation distributed a powerful report on the use of herbicides by the 
United States in Vietnam written by Gerhard Grümmer. The report detailed in 
scientific yet accessible language the use of various herbicides (Agent Orange, Agent 
Blue, and Agent White) and described the companies involved in the manufacture 
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and distribution of the herbicides. It targeted powerful American corporations such 
as Dow Chemical but also implicated segments of the West German BASF company. 
The internal conference report emphasized that the GDR delegation came well 
prepared for the deliberations and that its contributions were widely praised by the 
participants.29
In the early 1970s, East Germany solidified its status as a reliable and construc-
tive member of the international antiwar movement by faithfully attending both the 
Stockholm conferences as well as subsequent meetings which focused on American 
war crimes in Indochina. Through these activities and its development of antiwar 
research and documentaries, the GDR also increasingly created pragmatic alliances 
with West European antiwar organizations and became a significant distributor of 
antiwar materials. By the early 1970s, the Vietnam Committee had established working 
relationships with the British organization Medical Aid for Vietnam, the Dutch group 
Medisch Comité Nederland, as well as the radical Austrian group Anti-Imperialist 
Solidarity Committee (Antiimperialistisches Solidaritätskomitee). In addition to 
supplying these organizations with antiwar literature and documentaries, the GDR 
arranged for the transport of medical and blood donations from Western Europe and 
included them as part of its own shipments to the DRV.30
Although none of these international activities led to long-term political alliances, 
these policies and antiwar efforts on the part of the GDR garnered a great amount of 
respect for the country and established it as a fellow leader in antiwar circles. And 
as the movement against the war grew and as it attracted increasing numbers of 
politicians especially to the Stockholm Vietnam Conferences in the early 1970s, East 
Germany could delight both in the remarkable victory of the Vietnamese people against 
overwhelming odds as well as the increasing recognition which its own contributions 
yielded. It had established itself as an anti-imperialist champion in the eyes of many 
Third World countries and had raised its status among many West European nations 
as well.31 Despite all of its horrors and tragedies, the Vietnam War presented a long-
term political advantage for the SED government.
Layer 3: Enjoying the Support of the East German Population
The official solidarity with North Vietnam began early in East Germany and well before 
the American invasion. In the early 1950s, the two countries established diplomatic 
relations, and East Germany soon began supporting the DRV with economic and 
humanitarian aid. By 1957, East Germany was already the third-largest provider of 
aid, behind China and the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, East Germany was also 
one of the first countries to recognize the South Vietnamese National Liberation 
Front (NLF) and supported the rebel group with military aid.32
In July 1965, during the commemoration of the eleventh anniversary of the Geneva 
Accords which ended the French Indochina War in 1954, the GDR  government 
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announced the creation of the Vietnam Committee (Vietnam Ausschuss). This com-
mittee was established as part of the larger Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (Afro-
Asiatisches Solidaritätskomitee), which had been created in 1963 and which would 
be renamed the Solidarity Committee of the GDR (Solidaritätskomitee der DDR) in 
early 1973. The Vietnam Committee was the main hub of the antiwar efforts in the 
GDR throughout the 1960s and the 1970s and coordinated the numerous government 
campaigns as well as aligned them with the overall foreign relations policies of the 
SED government and those of the East Bloc countries.33
To be sure, it is no easy task to assess the true degree of public support for the 
Vietnam solidarity campaigns which were rolled out over the next decade and more. 
As many historians have attested, it is always difficult to get a reliable read on the 
public opinion in the GDR. Even when statistics and public opinion reports are avail-
able, they are fraught with potential pitfalls and complications. While East Germans 
were frequently surprisingly frank in their complaints and disagreements, everyone 
understood that there were limits to the degree of grumbling which the state tolerated 
and penalties attached to excessive noncooperation and outright opposition. East 
Germans knew to be circumspect in voicing their true opinions for fear of jeopardizing 
their career opportunities or just the chance of receiving a new apartment or other 
favors from state officials. Therefore, “double-talk” was widespread and an essential 
aspect of living within the confines of the East German state.34
Despite this caveat, the main trend lines of the popular support for the Vietnam 
solidarity campaigns do emerge from documentary sources. They show that the East 
German public was uncooperative or resistant to most official campaigns in the early 
years of the war in the mid-1960s. Like much of the rest of the world, the sentiment 
began to change in the late 1960s, however, as many East Germans became incensed 
by the war and were willing to do more to support the North Vietnamese people. This 
public antiwar mood and support for the solidarity campaigns reached their peak in 
the early 1970s, especially in 1972 and 1973, when the relentless US bombing raids 
and the eventual withdrawal of American troops further heightened support for the 
DRV underdog. The certainty of a DRV victory assured high interest until 1975, when 
the war’s immediacy began to fade despite the best efforts of the GDR government to 
keep its memory relevant and alive. In general, then, especially when compared with 
other government initiatives, the Vietnam solidarity campaign was rather successful 
overall. As Hermann Schwiesau, a long-time leading official in the East German 
foreign office and GDR ambassador to several countries, recalled after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall: “This was a unique solidarity campaign in GDR history in terms of its 
breadth, longevity and volume . . . . The willingness to donate on the part of the GDR 
population surpassed all previous campaigns.”35
Based on the reports of the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssi-
cherheit, MfS or Stasi), this support was rather halting in the initial years of the war. 
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Across the GDR, the official calls for solidarity donations largely went unanswered 
especially between 1964 and 1967. A Stasi official in Leipzig reported this broad nega-
tive sentiment in his district in August of 1966: “The missing sense of solidarity with 
and disinterest towards the Vietnamese people is predominant based on the unofficial 
reactions of all population groups—even among some comrades.”36 Frequently such 
rejections were justified with comments by East Germans that they did not want to 
unnecessarily prolong the war or simply that Vietnam was none of their business. At 
the same time, some requests for blood donations also revealed racist resentment, 
such as not wanting to provide “the yellow race with white blood.” And when the 
Warsaw Pact countries met in Bucharest in July of 1966 and opened the door to pos-
sibly sending military volunteers to Vietnam, the GDR public response was especially 
loud and unanimous in opposition to such an initiative.37
As might be expected, reports of negative responses remained part of the mix for 
the duration of the war well into the mid-1970s, yet the public lack of cooperation 
noticeably decreased towards the end of the decade parallel to the increased interna-
tional antiwar opposition. By 1970, Stasi officials reported a far greater willingness to 
donate time and money to the solidarity campaigns as well as increased and more vocal 
opposition to the war. In fact, at times positive reports came in the form of criticisms, 
as in the case of one collective which had produced motorcycles through overtime as 
a direct donation to the DRV; yet they stood uncollected in the parking lot and were 
rusting away. By early 1973, one district official reflected the changing mood of the 
population at the official end of the war: “The first reports after the signing of the 
end of the Vietnam War make it clear that the public is following these events with 
great interest and that they are welcomed unanimously.”38 
In addition, the monthly reports from the districts corroborated the notion that 
the GDR public had become far more involved in the solidarity campaigns by the early 
1970s. Reports from Dresden, for example, highlighted an ever-growing willingness 
to participate in the donation campaigns and referred to “thousands of new acts of 
solidarity and donation campaigns.” As one report from February 1973 summed up 
the situation, “The ever-widening solidarity movement is especially evident because 
many workers are willing to donate between 1–5% of their yearly bonus and an ever 
larger number have increased their monthly solidarity donations.”39 The same was 
true for Leipzig, where increasing segments of the population strongly condemned the 
renewed US bombing raids in 1972 and where numerous local solidarity campaigns 
were underway in late 1972 and 1973.40
These reports also correspond with the overall increase in public donations over 
the decade between 1966 and 1975. The yearly public donations amounted to roughly 
16 million Marks in 1966 and more than doubled by 1968. They reached a new peak 
in 1973, with more than 48 million, and almost doubled again by 1975 to a total of 
83 million Marks. Even though these donations always made up only a small portion 
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of the overall government aid provided to the DRV, they are notable for their sizes as 
well as their increases over the years.41
Individual groups and organizations frequently participated in the antiwar solidar-
ity campaigns as well. The Writers Association underwrote campaigns such as “Schools 
for Vietnam” or “Health for Vietnam” while the GDR churches combined their efforts 
under the banner of Bread for the World and donated 500,000 Marks towards the 
reconstruction and equipment of the hospital in Viet-Duc in the DRV in 1971 alone. 
Equally important was the establishment of an orthopedic center in North Vietnam, 
which, though delayed until 1975, would ultimately provide prosthetics for thousands 
of Vietnamese bombing victims.42 East German musicians organized the collection of 
musical instruments for the Hanoi Symphony, and the GDR Farmers Congress alone 
raised 6.5 million Marks in addition to the donation of farm tools and equipment.43 
Figure 2. Vietnam Protest Demonstration in East Berlin, Unter den Linden, late 1968  
(Courtesy of BStU Archiv; MfS-OTS-Fo-0055-Bild-0002) 
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By early 1973, GDR officials working in the Solidarity Committee of the GDR 
felt decidedly more upbeat about the reception of their campaigns than they had at 
the beginning of the war. Especially after the agreement to end the war in Vietnam 
was signed in January of 1973, they noted an especially “lively echo” among the 
East German population and “an even wider expansion of the solidarity movement.” 
After listing all the various past and present campaigns on behalf of the Vietnamese 
people, the Committee also committed itself to bringing 10,000 North Vietnamese to 
the GDR by the end of the decade in order to help with the education and training 
of the population as well as the rebuilding of the country after the devastating war.44
By contrast, the solidarity campaigns seemed to once again lose much of their 
popular appeal in the second half of the 1970s after the end of war despite the Vietnam 
Committee’s attempts to keep the legacy of the exemplary anti-imperialist struggle of 
the Vietnamese people alive. Part of this government strategy was a renaming cam-
paign which had started in the late 1960s. Collectives, schools, and other organizations 
were encouraged to adopt the name of Vietnamese heroes in order to keep the struggle 
of the DRV present in the daily life of the GDR. By the late 1970s, these efforts were 
especially focused towards the primary and secondary schools in East Germany both 
in terms of renaming schools and shaping the curricular as well as the extracurricular 
activities for students who came of age after the Vietnam War had ended. The goal of 
these governmental efforts was to use the memory of the war for “the mobilization of 
students in order to make them familiar with the Vietnamese struggle and strengthen 
the notion of the [international] solidarity movement.”45 Yet most of the GDR public 
seemed to have moved on in the second half of 1970s, preoccupied with more press-
ing and immediate issues like the Biermann case, expatriations, ever more onerous 
economic shortages, as well as the 1976 Montreal Olympics.
Complications and Obstacles to East Germany’s  
Vietnam Solidarity Campaigns
While the East German government was able to utilize the anti-Vietnam War rhetoric 
in a number of ways, and while there was some significant political convergence 
between the criticism in the West and some of the Communist positions, this did 
not mean that the East Berlin propaganda offensive was without complications or 
setbacks. These can only be addressed briefly within the confines of this article.
The first tension was that the two main imperialist foes, West Germany and the 
United States, retained their seductive appeal during this time period. If anything, 
the election of Brandt in 1969 and the implementation of Ostpolitik lengthened the 
shadow that West Germany threw over its East German neighbor. The GDR public 
admired Willy Brandt personally and was quite attracted to his government’s form of 
social democracy. The monthly reports in the GDR are filled with warnings of “the 
lack of ideological clarity” on the part of the East German public and references to 
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“illusions” about the true intentions of the FRG government under Brandt. Reading 
these reports, one comes away with a strong sense that most East Germans would 
rather have lived under a Brandt than an Ulbricht or a Honecker government.46
The United States, though much further removed and more abstract, maintained 
its symbolical appeal for freedom and unfulfilled East German desires despite the 
war in Vietnam. Especially the “other America,” the one which protested the war and 
expressed this opposition in music and films, never lost its magnetic force in the GDR. 
United States politics, on the one side, and American culture and aesthetic values 
and habitus, on the other, frequently inhabited two different spheres for ordinary 
East Germans, and the late 1960s and early 1970s were no exception.47
Another part of this complication of East Germany’s antiwar narrative was the 
fact that East Berlin was trying to engage its primary Cold War enemy, the United 
States, in negotiations starting in the mid-1960s. These diplomatic overtures were, 
of course, not shared with the public at large. The twin goals of this campaign were 
to reap concrete economic trade benefits as well as to lobby for the international 
recognition of the GDR. Since the United States and East Germany did not establish 
official diplomatic relations until 1974, these attempts were carried out through a 
number of indirect and unofficial channels. For example, East Germany encouraged 
and welcomed an increasing number of American visitors to the Leipziger Messe in 
the second half of the 1960s. In addition to its contacts to the American Communist 
party, the SED government also approached a number of left-leaning political groups 
in the hopes of establishing more political leverage. Increased calls for the exchange 
of scientists were part of this concerted GDR overture as well. However, very little 
came of these undertakings, since the United States viewed East Germany as one of 
the least flexible of the East European regimes and because it made its relationship 
with the GDR completely subservient to its infinitely more vital ties with its West 
German ally.48 
Far more challenging for the East German Vietnam narrative than these external 
tensions was the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the GDR’s support role in ending the 
Prague Spring. Nobody in East Germany bought the official line that the invasion was 
necessary in order to subdue an attempted “counterrevolutionary plot” in the CSSR. 
The brutal crushing of the democratic uprising in Czechoslovakia and the participa-
tion of East German troops in the invasion caused widespread protests in the GDR, 
but this opposition did not coalesce into an organized movement even though there 
were signs of protest everywhere. Only 20 out of 180 students at the University of 
Greifswald, for example, were willing to sign the Declaratory Acts which supported the 
invasion into Czechoslovakia. All over the country, young people spontaneously used 
graffiti and slogans like “Long live Dubc=ek—Freedom for Czechoslovakia” to express 
their solidarity with the Czech uprising. Work stoppages by East German workers and 
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leaflet campaigns by students were further signs of the large-scale discontent with East 
Germany’s obedient and hypocritical support for Moscow’s strong-armed tactics.49 
The invasion of the CSSR also seriously impacted the activities of the World Peace 
Council (WPC), which had evolved through the combined efforts of the East and 
West European Communist parties in the postwar period. The Vietnam War clearly 
provided a great opportunity to expand these activities across the East-West divide, and 
for a while the Council in fact functioned as a two-way information exchange between 
communist Eastern Europe and like-minded groups in the West. The East German 
chapter, the German Peace Council, had the strong backing of the SED government, 
but it was also a staunch supporter of Moscow and its political priorities. While it was 
successful in organizing solidarity activities for the DVR, the World Peace Council 
ultimately failed in effectively crossing borders because of its ideological rigidity and 
adherence to Soviet policies. The decisive break with Western organizations came in 
connection with the Warsaw Pact invasion in Czechoslovakia. As Günter Wernicke 
put it: “The Prague Spring of 1968 marked the watershed, despite the attempts of the 
WPC to polish its image in the 1970s . . . . It sealed the WPC’s fate as an instrument 
subject to the overriding influence of Soviet foreign policy.”50
A third major complication of East German antiwar propaganda strategy was the 
personal contact, or lack thereof, between the North Vietnamese guest students and 
workers and the GDR population. At best, North Vietnamese were tolerated in the 
GDR and at worst rejected by the GDR public at large. Despite the lofty rhetoric of 
aiding a brother country, North Vietnamese students and trainees in the GDR were 
relegated to a second-class status. This had as much to do with public resentment 
as with enforced North Vietnamese guidelines. Fearful that their fellow countrymen 
might grow soft or might adopt East Germany’s official anti-Chinese political stance, 
North Vietnamese officials closely supervised their comrades in the GDR and discour-
aged fraternization between them and their East German hosts. Not only personal 
interactions but also bourgeois pleasures like going to the movies and other cultural 
events were strongly discouraged. East Germans, for their part, increasingly began 
to view their Vietnamese guests both as financial burdens and—similar to their Pol-
ish neighbors—competitors for scarce consumer products. This latter accusation 
became far more pronounced in the late 1970s and 1980s, as more Vietnamese guest 
workers were brought to the GDR in order to compensate for the lack of workers in 
East Germany.51
Conclusion
Despite these various cross currents, the activities surrounding the Vietnam War were 
a significant net plus for the East German government in its Cold War battle against 
the West. First, it provided the SED leadership with significant support for its long-held 
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claim that the United States was a capitalist octopus set on strangling nascent socialist 
regimes. Likewise, the antiwar rhetoric opened up numerous venues to implicate the 
West German capitalist adversary and to put the Bonn government on the defensive. 
Second, it allowed the GDR to join and at times lead the burgeoning international 
opposition to the Vietnam War, which included not just the usual Communist allies 
but found receptive audiences in Western Europe and the developing world as well. 
Finally, unlike many other official campaigns, the opposition to the Vietnam War was 
backed by large segments of the East German population and somewhat lessened 
their disaffection from the SED government.
As several historians have reminded us, within the lifespan of East Germany 
there were always periods when the GDR was more stable and when the compro-
mise between “passive conformity and leaving politics to the party” was more widely 
accepted. Mary Fulbrook argues that “this compromise was, very nearly, achieved—
perhaps for the space of two or three years in the early to mid-1970s.” Marc-Dietrich 
Ohse concurs and even goes so far as to call the early 1970s the “golden years” of the 
GDR. In his recollections, Christoph Dieckmann similarly refers to 1973 as the time 
of “the closest relationship between the government and the [East German] youth.”52
While the population never accepted the SED government as legitimate, there 
were numerous reasons for the increased identification with the GDR during these 
years: the strengthening of the party apparatus and the Stasi, to be sure, but also ris-
ing living standards, greater cultural tolerance, and increased travel within the East 
Bloc; the stellar victories at the 1972 Munich Olympics and increased international 
acceptance also added to this increased conformity with the East German state.53 
The relatively effective anti-Vietnam War and solidarity campaigns as well as the 
resulting “Vietnam Bonus,” as this article argues, were another important cause for 
this greater stability of the GDR in the early 1970s.
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